Terms

Glossary

The words the debate about knowledge is conducted in, defined briefly and linked to the pages where they matter.

Ad hoc
Latin for "to this". An adjustment to a theory is ad hoc when it is made only to rescue the theory from a refutation and has no other consequence that could be tested. See: Popper, Lakatos.
Anomaly
A result that will not fit the accepted theory. For Kuhn, anomalies are set aside during normal science and bring on a crisis when enough of them accumulate. See: Kuhn.
A priori
Known independently of experience, as the truths of logic are usually held to be. Kant argued that some a priori truths, such as "every event has a cause", are also informative about the world. See: Kant.
Bayes' theorem
A theorem of probability that gives the probability of a hypothesis in the light of evidence, from the probability of the evidence if the hypothesis is true and the probability of the hypothesis beforehand. See: The Bayesians.
Bucket theory of the mind
Popper's name for the view that the mind is an empty container that experience fills, with knowledge as what accumulates. He opposed it with the searchlight: observation directed by a prior question. See: Locke.
Conjecture
A guess: a theory proposed without proof or justification, to be tested and criticised. For Popper and Deutsch all knowledge begins and remains conjectural. See: Deutsch, section 2.
Constructor
In constructor theory, anything that can cause a transformation in other physical systems and keep its ability to do so again. Catalysts, engines and living cells are examples. See: Marletto.
Corroboration
Popper's term for what a theory gains by surviving serious attempts to refute it. It is a record of past tests. It does not make the theory probable or justified. See: Popper.
Credence
A degree of belief, written as a number between 0 and 1. See: The Bayesians.
Critical rationalism
Popper's philosophy: we cannot justify our theories, but we can criticise them rationally and prefer those that withstand criticism best. Deutsch's position is a development of it. See: Popper.
Demarcation
The problem of saying what separates empirical science from everything else. Popper's criterion is falsifiability. See: Popper.
Empiricism
The doctrine that all knowledge of the world comes from sense experience. Bacon, Locke and Hume are its classic figures; Quine a modern one. See: Locke, Hume, Quine.
Epistemology
The theory of knowledge: what it is, where it comes from and how it grows.
Evolutionary epistemology
The view that knowledge of every kind grows as species do, by variation and selective retention. See: Campbell.
Explanation
A statement about what is there, what it does, and how and why. Deutsch holds that the aim of science is explanation, with prediction as a means of testing it. See: Deutsch, section 3.
Fallibilism
The view that any of our beliefs may be mistaken and that there are no authoritative sources of knowledge. It is not scepticism: fallibilists hold that knowledge exists and can be improved. See: Xenophanes, Popper.
Falsifiability
A theory is falsifiable if some possible observation would contradict it. Popper made this the mark of empirical science. See: Popper.
Foundationalism
The view that knowledge must rest on a base of beliefs that need no further support, whether supplied by the senses or by reason. See: Descartes, Sextus Empiricus.
Gettier case
A situation in which someone has a justified true belief that is not knowledge, because it is true by luck. See: Gettier.
Hard to vary
Deutsch's criterion for a good explanation: its details cannot be changed without spoiling its account of what it explains. Myths fail the test; the axial-tilt theory of the seasons passes it. See: Deutsch, section 3.
Holism
The thesis that hypotheses are tested only in groups, so that a failed prediction does not show which of them is false. Also called the Duhem–Quine thesis. See: Quine.
Idols of the mind
Bacon's four sources of systematic error: those of human nature (the Tribe), of the individual (the Cave), of language (the Marketplace) and of philosophical systems (the Theatre). See: Bacon.
Incommensurability
Kuhn's and Feyerabend's claim that rival paradigms share no common measure by which they can be compared point for point. See: Kuhn, Feyerabend.
Induction
Supposed reasoning from observed cases to a general law or to unobserved cases: these swans are white, so all swans are white. Popper and Deutsch deny that any such form of reasoning exists. See: Aristotle, Bacon, Hume.
Instrumentalism
The view that scientific theories are tools for predicting observations and make no claim about what really exists. Deutsch rejects it. See: Quine.
Justification
Whatever is supposed to show that a belief is true or probably true: evidence, proof, a reliable source. The central dispute on this site is whether knowledge needs it. See: Sextus Empiricus, Compare all views.
Justified true belief
The traditional analysis of knowledge, descended from Plato: you know something when you believe it, it is true, and you are justified in believing it. See: Socrates and Plato, Gettier.
Justificationism
The assumption that knowledge is belief that has been justified. Critical rationalists use the word for the tradition they reject.
Münchhausen trilemma
Hans Albert's name for the ancient sceptical argument that any attempt at justification ends in an infinite regress, a circle or an arbitrary stopping point. See: Sextus Empiricus.
Naturalised epistemology
Quine's proposal that the theory of knowledge should become part of empirical psychology, studying how people in fact arrive at their beliefs. See: Quine.
Normal science
Kuhn's term for routine research within an accepted paradigm, which extends it and does not question it. See: Kuhn.
Paradigm
For Kuhn, the shared theories, exemplary problems, methods and standards that define a scientific community's work at a given time. See: Kuhn.
Prior
In Bayesian reasoning, the credence given to a hypothesis before a piece of evidence is taken into account. See: The Bayesians.
Problem of induction
Hume's problem: no argument can show that unobserved cases will resemble observed ones without assuming the very thing to be shown. See: Hume, Deutsch, section 1.
Rationalism
In its classical sense, the doctrine that reason alone, without the senses, is a source of knowledge about the world. See: Descartes.
Reach
Deutsch's word for the ability of an explanation to solve problems beyond those it was created to solve. See: Campbell.
Research programme
For Lakatos, a series of theories sharing a hard core of assumptions, protected by a belt of auxiliary hypotheses that is adjusted when predictions fail. See: Lakatos.
Scepticism
The view that knowledge is impossible, or that judgement should be suspended. The ancient Pyrrhonists arrived at it by showing that no belief can be justified. See: Sextus Empiricus.
Tacit knowledge
Knowledge that its holder cannot put fully into words, such as how to ride a bicycle or recognise a face. Deutsch's term for a similar idea is inexplicit knowledge. See: Polanyi.
Theory-laden
Observation is theory-laden because what we notice, and what we take it to be, depend on theories we already hold. See: Kant, Feyerabend.
Universal explainer
Deutsch's term for a person: an entity able to create explanatory knowledge of any kind, limited only by the laws of physics. See: Deutsch, section 4.
World 3
Popper's name for the realm of objective contents of thought, such as theories, problems and arguments, as distinct from physical things (World 1) and mental states (World 2). See: Popper.